Machine Learning to Ensure Data Integrity in Power System Topological Network Database by Anwar, Adnan et al.
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Anwar, Adnan, Mahmood, Abdun, Ray, Biplob, Mahmud, Md Apel and Tari, Zahir
(2020) Machine Learning to Ensure Data Integrity in Power System Topological Network




This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link:
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/47766/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users
to access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on
NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies
of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes
without  prior  permission  or  charge,  provided  the  authors,  title  and  full  bibliographic
details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The
content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is
available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the
published version of  the research,  please visit  the publisher’s website (a subscription
may be required.)
                        
electronics
Article
Machine Learning to Ensure Data Integrity in Power
System Topological Network Database
Adnan Anwar 1,*,† , Abdun Mahmood 2 , Biplob Ray 3 , Md Apel Mahmud 4 and
Zahir Tari 5
1 School of IT, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC 3216, Australia
2 Department of Computer Science and Information Technology, La Trobe University,
Bundoora, VIC 3086, Australia; a.mahmood@latrobe.edu.au
3 Centre for Intelligent Systems (CIS), Central Queensland University, Rockhampton, QLD 4701, Australia;
b.ray@cqu.edu.au
4 School of Engineering, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC 3216, Australia; apel.mahmud@deakin.edu.au
5 Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering, RMIT University,
Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia; zahit.tari@rmit.edu.au
* Correspondence: adnan.anwar@deakin.edu.au
† Current address: 75 Pigdons Rd, Waurn Ponds VIC 3216, Australia.
Received: 29 March 2020; Accepted: 20 April 2020; Published: 24 April 2020


Abstract: Operational and planning modules of energy systems heavily depend on the information
of the underlying topological and electric parameters, which are often kept in database within
the operation centre. Therefore, these operational and planning modules are vulnerable to cyber
anomalies due to accidental or deliberate changes in the power system database model. To validate,
we have demonstrated the impact of cyber-anomalies on the database model used for operation of
energy systems. To counter these cyber-anomalies, we have proposed a defence mechanism based on
widely accepted classification techniques to identify the abnormal class of anomalies. In this study,
we find that our proposed method based on multilayer perceptron (MLP), which is a special class of
feedforward artificial neural network (ANN), outperforms other exiting techniques. The proposed
method is validated using IEEE 33-bus and 24-bus reliability test system and analysed using ten
different datasets to show the effectiveness of the proposed method in securing the Optimal Power
Flow (OPF) module against data integrity anomalies. This paper highlights that the proposed machine
learning-based anomaly detection technique successfully identifies the energy database manipulation
at a high detection rate allowing only few false alarms.
Keywords: smart grid; energy system; database; MLP; machine learning; OPF; anomaly
1. Introduction
In recent years, reassurance of information integrity in the energy sector has become crucial as
several cyber security vulnerabilities on the complex energy system infrastructure have proven to be
related to data anomalies. In 2010, the invention of “the Stuxnet worm” [1] has made the industrial
and research communities more concerned about the data integrity, privacy and confidentiality of
the real-time operation of control centres. In a recent report of the “Industrial Control Systems Cyber
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT)”, it has been mentioned that among the 200 cyber security
incidents that happened across all the critical infrastructure in 2013, the maximum number of attacks
(111 in incidents) are observed in the energy sector (53%) [2].
Due to smartisation of the grid, physical energy systems are highly coupled with the Information
and Communication Technology (ICT)-based cyber systems. These introduced new security
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vulnerabilities and threats that need to be addressed using appropriate advanced techniques. As the
current security approaches are developed focusing on the physical grid only, they are either not
applicable or incompatible or simply inadequate to protect today’s power grids [3].
While physical energy system research has a long history, research focusing on cyber-security of a
smart energy system is passing its early age. The new class of cyberattacks named “False Data Injection
(FDI) Attack” targeting smart energy systems presented in [4] shows that the malicious modification of
the measurement data may make DC state estimation vulnerable to malicious modification. Generally,
the utility control centres are used to calculate the energy system’s states by minimising the errors
between the calculated and measurement data. The authors in [4] have proposed heuristic approaches
to counter both random attacks and targeted attacks in the DC state estimation. Further enhancement
of this work can be found in [5]. While the research works in [4,5] focus on the unidentified attack
construction, other research works are focused on developing the attack defence model [6,7] to counter
those attacks. Another subclass of the FDI attack is named “Load Redistribution (LR)” attack, which can
artificially increase or decrease in demand at load buses by keeping total change of load as zero [8,9].
It is important to note that the aforementioned FDI and LR attacks assume that the compromised
measurement data are used to introduce an attack into the grid, although attacks can be generated by
other means.
A survey on different types of cyberattacks designed for the smart grid is presented in [10,11].
Although some research works have been conducted on cyberattacks in Energy Systems [4–7,10],
only a few considered Database Manipulation (DM) attacks. In [12], authors have proposed an
anomaly based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) using Principle Component Analysis (PCA) to protect
the database that stores the power system model. The IDS is then employed to detect anomalies in the
network power flows due to database manipulation. However, the performance of the PCA based
technique in [12] is highly dependent on the empirical tuning of the threshold value, which is used for
anomaly detection. Another anomaly detection method is proposed in [13] to solve a similar type of
problem as in [12]. The output power from a pre-trained Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and OPF
module are compared to detect an intrusion in [13].
In this work, we implement an efficient multilayer perceptron (MLP) based classification approach
to detect DB intrusions of a power system. With extensive experimental evaluation, we have observed
that MLP is very good fit to detect the intrusions that exist in a power system database. As there is no
actual data of power system database attacks [12], this paper creates its possible scenarios to simulate
both the normal profile and attack profile (labelled data). In order to consider a wide range of possible
scenarios, we consider the attack cases discussed in [12] and in [13] as well as additional potential
attack cases. These attack cases include database parameters alteration, insertion or deletion by various
means. Once we obtain the labelled dataset, we train it using MLP type feed-forward ANN. Next,
we test the performance of the detection model against both normal data (no attack present) and attack
data (different types of modification in the database). Our test result shows that the classification based
IDS technique can identify the normal instances and attack instances very accurately. We also compared
the proposed method with the results reported in [12,13]. The comparison shows the proposed method
has better accuracy compared with the existing state of the art ML based models.
In this work, practical load data is obtained from the repository of the Electric Power Research
Institute’s (EPRI) the Smart Grid tool OpenDSS [14]. We simulate the attack scenario using IEEE
benchmark power systems using MatPower [15]. The proposed method has superior accuracy
and efficiency over the existing methods for a similar test setup. The detail results, presented in
this manuscript, show promising prospect towards a practical implementation to secure the power
system database.
2. Background and Related Work
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of an energy operation centre and its connectivity with the
physical grid through the communication network. The role of the energy system database is also
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depicted in this figure. The operation of the modern power system heavily relies on field measurements
for improved monitoring and control. However, field measurements are prone to measurement errors
due to device accuracy, communication noises and device malfunctions [16]. Therefore, to check the
measurement data integrity, modules like state estimators and bad data detectors are used. These
modules not only suppress the measurement noises and identify the corrupted measurements but also
determine the system states. Importantly, modules like state estimator and bad data detector work
are based on the principle that the underlying energy system topological and parameter information
stored in the energy system database is correct. However, if the ground truth is wrong, it would
affect the whole procedure [12,13]. More importantly, a good number of planning decisions is made
based on the power system electric database information. As a result, falsified database information
would lead to misleading planning decisions. DB manipulation can be performed internally or
externally. According to Jin et al. “Insider attacks are launched by malicious users who are entrusted
with authorised (i.e., insider) access of a system” [17]. Authors in [17] also highlight that the
insider attack comprises around 29% of all cyber crimes and may lead to severe loss or damage.
On 23 December 2015, a Ukrainian power grid attack happened where the adversary hacked the
energy SCADA system and remotely controlled the operation centre to deliberately shut down the
energy supply [18]. Similarly, the database can be manipulated by gaining access to the system,
and consequently, this would affect the physical operation of the grid. Realising the importance,
several research works highlighted detection techniques for energy database anomalies [12,13,19,20].
Figure 1. Functionality of energy database within energy management system database architecture.
Authors in [12] developed an anomaly detection technique for energy system databases to monitor
power flow results detecting the anomalies in the database with changes in the power flow results.
Authors in [12] used PCA-based method and tested the performance of their work by considering
attacks like line removal, single line parameter and rating alterations. Some additional types of
attacks are demonstrated in [13] where the line connectivity information, e.g., origin node of any
line, is modified, to demonstrate as an attack case. To detect the changes, authors in [13] applied
ANN-based models. Authors in [19] proposed a forecasting and threshold-based approach to detect
the intrusions within the database. Authors in [19] used a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to
develop a multivariate forecasting model and three-sigma rule is applied to detect anomalies. In [20],
authors used a graph matching approach where the problem is modelled as a Quadratic Assignment
Problem (QAP) and utilised the Graduated Assignment algorithm to solve the matching problem.
All of the above methods demonstrate capabilities by considering a subset of attack types. Moreover,
it is important to verify the success rate of these methods against a wide range of possible attack
scenarios. Besides, the behaviour of the combined attack scenarios also needs to be addressed.
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3. Problem Statement
During a topological database attack, the attacker may or may not have prior knowledge of the
topological connectivity or associated configuration information. For example, an insider with the
knowledge of the power system DB connectivity, structure of the database and electric parameter
information [21] may launch an attack . In the case when the attacker is not an insider, the adversary
may gain the access externally and launch structured (has domain knowledge) or unstructured attacks
(lack of domain knowledge). One relevant example is the 2015 Ukraine power grid cyber-attack [18]
where attackers took the control of the SCADA network and intentionally shut down the switches
of some distribution areas. Whether the attack is structured or unstructured, a significant or notable
amount of database manipulation would be clearly identified as it would not provide converged system
operation or would exhibit significant deviations in operating conditions. As a result, the responsible
operators or automated processes would be alerted easily and rectify the issue. However, an intelligent
attacker may strategically corrupt the information of the database in such a way that the operational
modules of energy management system (e.g., OPF and State Estimator modules) converge, but their
outputs violate the normal operating limits, which may cause unintended harmful actions to be initiated by
the operator [12,13]; Due to such attacks, the automated process or the human operator takes operational
decisions relying on the misleading outputs from corrupted databases. Even any planning decision based
on the corrupted information of DB would lead to a misleading planning solution [20].
To explain, we consider the example of the three-bus power system [20], shown in Figure 2.
The figure represents the topology of a three-bus power system with two generators and one load
centre. The electric parameter information are represented in the figure. Typically, all topological
connectivity information (e.g., which bus is connected with whom, which switch is on and which
switch is off, etc) and electric parameter information (e.g., line resistance and reactance, generator and
load capacities and ratings, line ratings, etc.) are stored in an energy system database. The second
column (from left) of the Table 1 titled “Vmag (before)” shows the voltage profile of each individual
node of the three-bus test system after a converged power-flow solution. Now, assume an insider or
an external adversary manipulates the line parameter information between the bus 1 to 2 of the DB.
The corrupted line parameter reactance increases from 0.4 pu to 0.8 pu, also highlighted red in the
Figure 2. The voltage profile from the converged power-flow output considering the manipulated DB
information is presented in the third column (from left) of Table 1. A slight mismatch is observed in the
results due to DB information manipulation. As IEEE/ANSI recommended practice for voltage stability
limit is 1.05 pu, the system operator may take some remedial actions (say, change in generation/load or
reactive power support) to mitigate the problem. However, it was not necessary as the actual physical
system is running at 1.05 pu whereas the realisation of from the OPF is 1.052 due to wrong topological
information. Any further actions based on the manipulated DB would misguide the operation and
may affect on the system stability and reliability.I1 I2Node 1 Node 2Node 3z01= -j1 pu z02= -j0.8 puz12= -j0.4 pu (-j0.8 pu)z13= -j0.2 pu z23= -j0.2 puz34= -j0.08 puNode 4
Figure 2. Three bus test system [20].
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Table 1. Node voltages before and after DB manipulation.
Node Name Vmag (Before) Vmag (After) Comments
Node 1 1.0500 pu 1.052 pu limit exceeded
Node 2 1.0400 pu 1.039 pu within limit
Node 3 1.0450 pu 1.045 pu within limit
Therefore, it is important to monitor the energy system DB for any change. The aim of the
proposed work is to detect the anomalies in a power system’s topological and configuration DB by
leveraging powerful machine learning tools.
4. Attack Generation
Typically, operational decisions of power systems are conducted based on the measurement data
and the stored data of network assets (for example, conductors, transformers, loads, generators, etc.,
and their conductivities). This stored database is the blueprint of the physical power grid. In this
work, we consider eight types of DB attacks as listed in Table 2. These attack classes include the cases
discussed in [12,13] as well as some extra possible cases of database manipulation.
Table 2. Attack scenarios.
Attack Case Description of Attacks
Case 1 Modify connectivity of a single line
Case 2 Modify connectivity of multiple lines
Case 3 Remove a line
Case 4 Line parameter alteration of a single line
Case 5 Line parameter alteration of multiple lines
Case 6 Modify line reactance and ratings
Case 7 Alter the PCC of generator node
Case 8 Modify origins of multiple lines
Case 9 Combination of Cases 2, 3 and 4.This case includes modification of multiple line parameters and removal of a line
4.1. Attack Scenario 1
The first attack scenario (case 1) deals with the modification of the connectivity of a single power
system line. That means the source node and the destination node of a power line are changed in
the database. For example, in IEEE 24-bus reliability test system [22], there are 24 nodes and 38 lines.
For this type of attacks, source and destination node information related to one single line will be
changed. Say, the original source and destination of line 1 are nodes 1 and 3, respectively. As a result
of such consideration, the source of line 1 can be any node other than 1 and the destination can be any
node other than 3. All information related to IEEE benchmark 24 bus reliability test system can be
obtained from [15]. In this attack case, we generate attack by manipulating the source and destination
nodes of any individual line once at a time to consider an attack scenario.
4.2. Attack Scenario 2
This scenario is extended from attack scenario 1. In this attack scenario, we consider the alteration
of connectivity nodes among multiple lines. As IEEE 24 bus reliability test system, shown in Figure 3,
has 38 lines, we randomly select the number of targeted lines to be attacked and randomly select line
IDs against those numbers. Next, the source and destination nodes of those lines are modified. If more
lines are modified, it may be trivial to detect the presence of the attack as power flow solution may not
converge. Therefore, we have limited the number of manipulated lines to maximum five.
Electronics 2020, 9, 693 6 of 17
Figure 3. IEEE 24 bus reliability test system [22].
4.3. Attack Scenario 3
This attack scenario replicates a power system topology attack. In Test Case 3,a single line from
the set of all lines in the test system is removed from the database. For some cases, the system power
flow will not converge for this action but most of the time it converges. As a result of line removal,
the power system topology represents a different one than the original. To explain this attack scenario,
let consider the IEEE 24-bus reliability test system, which has 38 lines. After generating an attack
scenario of this kind, the total line will be basically 37. For each attack case, we randomly select one
line out of all, which is then removed. This attack scenario is based on the attack cases considered both
in [12,13].
4.4. Attack Scenario 4
This attack scenario targets the electric properties of the test system represented in the power
system database. Therefore, important line parameters like resistance and reactance values are changed
from the database in this test case. Here, we change the line parameters randomly between −90% to
+90% of their original values. Decisions based on manipulated line parameter information would be
misleading. In this attack scenario, the electric parameter manipulation is performed only on one line.
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4.5. Attack Scenario 5
This attack scenario is similar to Attack Scenario 4, except here we consider manipulation of
multiple line parameters instead of a single line. Here, multiple lines are selected randomly where line
parameters are modified randomly from −90% to +90% of their original values.
4.6. Attack Scenario 6
Beside line reactance, the maximum and minimum power ratings of different lines are altered in
Case 6. Note, the maximum and minimum power ratings of different lines are used as constraints in
the optimum power flow solution. Hence, modifying those ratings in the database would lead to an
optimal solution, which is not the true optimal and would produce misleading operational decisions.
This attack scenario is also reported in [12].
4.7. Attack Scenario 7
In this attack case, the point of common coupling (PCC) of the generator nodes is altered.
That means, power generation source nodes are manipulated in the database. For example, as per IEEE
24 bus reliability test system, generator 3 is connected at node 7. In this attack scenario, the PCC node
(which is actually node 7) will be replaced by another node. Similar attack scenarios are generated for
all generator PCC nodes.
4.8. Attack Scenario 8
This attack case is very similar to Attack Scenario 2 but considers the manipulation of source
nodes only. This means, sources nodes of multiple lines are manipulated to construct this attack case.
4.9. Attack Scenario 9
This attack case demonstrates a combined attack behaviour. In this experiment, we have combined
the above discussed attack cases 2, 3 and 4. Therefore, the execution of the attacks would modify
multiple line parameter values and remove a line connectivity information from the database.
In Table 3, a comparison of attack cases is presented. Out of nine different attack scenarios,
Valenzuela et al. consider three attack scenarios in [12], which are attack scenarios 3, 4 and 6. On the
other hand, Mousavian et al. in [13] consider three attack scenarios, which are 1, 3 and 8 in the above
mentioned test cases. From Table 3, it is evident that our proposed model considers all sets of attacks
presented in [12,13] as well as a new set of potential attack cases.
Table 3. Comparison of test scenarios in existing and proposed work.
Attack Scenarios PCA Based Method in [12] ANN-Based Method in [13] Proposed Method
Attack Scenario 1 - ! !
Attack Scenario 2 - - !
Attack Scenario 3 ! ! !
Attack Scenario 4 ! - !
Attack Scenario 5 - - !
Attack Scenario 6 ! - !
Attack Scenario 7 - - !
Attack Scenario 8 - ! !
Attack Scenario 9 - - !
5. Attack Detection
Attack detection in power system database requires close to real-time operation. Hence,
we provide an efficient detection architecture where intrusions are not detected directly from the
database; rather, it uses a detection mechanism that involves database and determines the existence of
intrusions, as discussed elaborately in the following section.
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The optimal power flow (OPF) module is a vital module that is used in the energy management
system of a power system operation centre for decision making purposes. This operational module
needs the information of power system conductivity and component parameter information to make
its decisions. Therefore, any change or modification in the database will impact on the output of the
OPF module. Here, we consider the output of OPF module (power flow data of different lines of a
test system) for data preparation. We consider both normal and attack instances to train the model.
The normal profile is created based on the load data obtained from the repository of Electric Power
Research Institute’s (EPRI) Smart Grid tool OpenDSS [14] and from the Global Energy Forecasting
Competition 2012 [23]. We simulate the attack scenarios on IEEE benchmark power transmission
systems using MatPower [15] by considering the attack cases discussed in Section 4. We consider
hourly load data to generate 33,720 normal instances (for around 4 years of data) and same load profile
with different attack strategies to generate another 33,720 attack instances. All normal and attack
instances are used to train a model using multilayer perceptron (MLP).
In this paper, we propose a framework in a way where the information integrity of the database is
checked by monitoring the patterns of power flows that are derived from the database. That means,
instead of checking database anomalies, the database information is used to calculate the optimal
power flows, and then, that measurement information is used to check the integrity issues. The whole
process is summarised in the Figure 4. In the proposed framework, first energy system DB information
is used to calculate the optimal power flows. Next, power angle measurements are extracted and fed
into the machine learning models. After the training and evaluation, the models predict whether there
is any anomaly in the phase measurements. As phase measurements are the reflection of the energy
database information, this intelligent way of detection helps to identify database anomalies.Energy Database Asset and Topological Connectivity Information Optimal Power Flow Calculation Extraction of Power Flow Angle Measurements Use Machine Learning  to Check the Patterns of the Power Flow Angles Decide Whether the Database has Integrity Issues or Not based on the Algorithm Outputs
Figure 4. Proposed database anomaly detection framework.
Similar approaches have been proposed in [12,13]. The authors of this paper also worked using a
similar set up in [19] where forecast and threshold-based detection techniques were utilised to detect
power distribution system anomalies. In this work, the authors have used benchmark classification
techniques and validated using two IEEE test systems. Most importantly, the results are compared
with benchmark algorithms while introducing a wide variety of attack scenarios (10 attack cases) that
include the attack cases discussed in [12,13] as well as new types of attacks.
Multilayer perceptron (MLP) is a special class of feedforward artificial neural network (FF-ANN).
MLP is simply networks of perceptrons that combine input layers, some hidden layers and an output
layer. The input layers are connected with the input attributes. Here, in our test setup for the 24-bus
reliability test case, we have phase angles from 24 nodes of the network. Therefore, the input layer
is connected with these 24 attributes. The output layer is connected with the target classes. In this
experiment, our target is to detect normal and anomalous instances due to database intrusions. Hence,
the output layer will be connected with two nodes: (i) Normal and (ii) Attack instances. Within the
input and output layers, there are hidden layers. We have performed experiments for a wide range
of hidden layers with different number of neurons/nodes in each of these hidden layers. We have
observed that 3 hidden layers provided an optimal solution in terms of time and accuracy for our
considered datasets. For the hidden layers, we have considered 13, 24, 26 neutrons. The number of
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nodes or neutrons for the first layer is selected based on the formula: (number of attributes + classes)/2.
The numbers in the second and third layers represent the number of attributes and summation of
attributes and classes, respectively. We have also conducted experiments for different settings of
momentum and learning rate. The optimal setting is 0.1 for learning rate and 0.05 for momentum.
The maximum number of epochs is considered to be 1500. With this setup, we have tested the algorithm
for all nine attack scenarios. A conceptual diagram of training and testing procedure is shown in

































Figure 5. Solution architecture.
6. Results and Discussions
In this section, first, we demonstrate the impact of database manipulation attack and then
implement a wide range of standard machine learning techniques to classify the normal and attack
instances considering all of the above mentioned eight attack scenarios.
The database manipulation attack can be performed as a form of insider attack [21]. Alternatively,
similar to the 2015 Ukraine power grid cyber-attack [18], an attacker can seize SCADA under control
and manipulate the energy system database to falsify the operational decisions. According to the
attack scenarios 4 and 5, the impact of line parameter alteration attack on the voltage profile after the
converged OPF is demonstrated in Figures 6 and 7. In these figures, the actual OPF voltage output
is represented using the green line and the OPF output after database manipulation is represented
using the red line. From the Figures 6 and 7, it is very difficult to justify the impact of the database
attack as per unit voltage outcomes are within ±5% of the rated voltage. Therefore, advanced
machine-learning methods are required to understand the correlation of the OPF outputs during the
normal operating condition and utilise that training model to identify the possible DB anomalies.
For the performance evaluation, we use a wide variety of classifiers which include probabilistic,
non-probabilistic, binary classifier, and rule based classifiers. The classifier includes Naive Bayes,
BayesNet, Logistic Regression, Decision Table, Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) deep neural network
(DNN), Support Vector Machine (SVM) with PUK kernel, MLP and AdaBoost algorithms. Further
description of these techniques are detailed in [24].
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Figure 6. DB attack with line parameter alteration of a single line.


















Figure 7. DB attack with line parameter alteration of multiple lines.
The dataset is generated based on the 24-bus IEEE reliability test system. For each dataset,
instances (samples) contain phase angle measurements from each of the 24 nodes (buses) of the system.
Therefore, the dataset has 24 attributes. Around 4 years of load data have been considered from the
Global Energy Forecasting Competition 2012 [23]. After removing some missing values, the total hourly
samples became 33,720 for those approximately four years of data. Therefore, the developed dataset
for each experimental scenario has 33,720 samples for both normal and attack classes. Hence, the total
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samples for each experimental scenario is 67,440, which make the dimension of the dataset 67,440 by
24. Here, the dataset has equal samples for each class in order to avoid the class imbalance problem.
In this research, the authors have considered 66% of the generated data as train and the remaining
34% of the dataset for testing purposes. To do that, at first, the complete data is randomly shuffled
using the Fisher–Yates shuffle based on WEKA. After shuffling, approximately 66% (around two-thirds)
of the data for each class (both attack and normal) is taken, and the union of these per-class subsets is
used as the training set. The remaining 34% data is used for testing. The dataset has been visualised in
Figure 8. Here, t-SNE method is used for visualisation purposes. t-SNE is a nonlinear dimensionality
reduction technique that can transform a high-dimensional dataset into a low-dimensional space. Here,
we have converted a 24-dimension dataset into two dimensions. From the figure, it is evident that both
attack class (cyan) and normal data (red) are not easily separable.










Figure 8. t-SNE of the dataset for experimental scenario 5.
We have used machine learning tool-Weka [24] to evaluate the performance of these methods
using nine test cases. Some test cases discussed in this work are similar to those of [12,13] as indicated
in Table 3.
For the developed nine test scenarios, we perform the experiments using the classifiers Naive
Bayes, BayesNet, Logistic Regression, Decision Table, Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) deep neural
network (DNN), Support Vector Machine (SVM) with PUK kernel, MLP and AdaBoost. To perform
the experiments, we followed the procedure shown in Figure 5.
At first, we perform the experiments on the dataset 1 that represent the attack case 1 where the
connectivity node information in the database has been modified. The results are presented in the
Table 4. For this experiment, we have reported Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F-Measures. Based on
the performance matrices, Naive Bayes, AdaBoost and Logistic regression perform poorly whereas
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SVM, MLP and LSTM show superior outcomes. The best accuracy is obtained using the MLP algorithm
which is 97.87%. For this case, the FP rate is 2.1% with a precision of 98%. The total testing phase
requires only 0.11 s. The performance matrices for other algorithms are also reported in Table 4.
Table 4. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 1.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 71.36% 71.4% 28.2% 75.2% 71.4% 70.3% 0.18 s
BayesNet 86.62% 86.6% 13.2% 88.1% 86.6% 86.5% 0.04 s
Logistic Regression 72.09% 72.1% 27.6% 73.8% 72.1% 71.6% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 90.27% 90.3% 9.5% 91.6% 90.3% 90.2% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 95.45% 94.7% 4.55% 99.94% 91.04% 95.28% 0.8 s
SVM (PUK) 90.2% 90.2% 9.6% 91.8% 90.2% 90.1% 7.71 s
MLP 97.87% 97.9% 2.1% 98.0% 97.9% 97.9% 0.11s
AdaBoost 78.45% 78.5% 21.1% 85% 78.5% 77.5% 0.01 s
Next, we perform the experiment for the dataset 2 that considers the attack scenario 2. Results for
this test case are presented in Table 5. For this experimental setup, the overall performance is better
than the first dataset. Based on the accuracy, precision, recall, FP rate and F-score, the top performing
algorithm is LSTM. The second best one is MLP. LSTM has TP rate of 99.58% whereas MLP has 99.4%.
The FP rate for MLP is only 0.6% and for LSTM is only 0.4%. These two algorithms perform better than
others in terms of any performance measures. In terms of time requirements, both of the algorithms
complete all the test instances within a second. In Dataset 3, the MLP performs better than the LSTM,
as shown in Table 6. The accuracies of MLP and LSTM are 94.8% and 92.24%, respectively. For both of
these algorithms, the FP rate is less than 8%.
Among all nine datasets, we observe that the scenario 4 is the toughest as most of the algorithms
perform extremely poor for this case. In this case, the line resistance and reactance are changed
randomly from −90% to +90%. If the modification is not that much significant (e.g., close to the original
value), the classifier finds it very difficult to determine its class. Therefore, most of the algorithm has
accuracy under 81%, see the results in Table 7. For this attack scenario, the best performing is again
MLP, which produces an accuracy of 80.7%, with a TP and FP rate of 86.1% and 18.9%, respectively.
Table 5. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 2.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 82.72% 82.7% 17.1% 83.8% 82.7% 82.6% 0.08 s
BayesNet 97.12% 97.1% 2.8% 97.2% 97.1% 97.1% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 86.95% 86.9% 12.8% 88.9% 86.8% 86.8% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 97.93% 97.9% 2.0% 98.0% 97.9% 97.9% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 99.58% 99.58% 0.42% 100% 99% 99.57% 0.82 s
SVM (PUK) 94.8% 94.8% 5.2% 95.3% 94.8% 94.8% 7.9 s
MLP 99.4% 99.4% 0.6% 99.4% 99.4% 99.4% 0.03 s
AdaBoost 95.07% 95.1% 4.9% 95.3% 95.1% 90.4% 0.01 s
Table 6. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 3.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 64.56% 64.6% 34.9% 69.2% 64.6% 62.5% 0.08 s
BayesNet 72.7% 72.7% 27% 74.4% 72.7% 72.3% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 62.5% 62.5% 37.2% 63.5% 62.5% 61.9% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 86% 86% 13.7% 88.9% 86% 85.8% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 92.24% 92.24% 7.76% 95.06% 88.70% 91.77% 0.49 s
SVM (PUK) 80.75% 80.8% 18.9% 86.1% 80.8% 80.1% 12.2 s
MLP 94.8% 94.8% 5.1% 95.3% 94.8% 94.8% 0.11 s
AdaBoost 67.11% 67.1% 32.2% 79% 67.1% 63.5% 0.01 s
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Table 7. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 4.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 55.05% 55.1% 44.4% 57.7% 55.1% 51.4% 0.06 s
BayesNet 61.57% 61.6% 37.7% 76% 61.6% 55.7% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 54.48% 54.5% 45.3% 54.7% 54.5% 54.1% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 62.5% 62.5% 36.8% 76.8% 62.5% 56.9% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 58.75% 58.74% 41.25% 85.88% 21.27% 34.10% 0.69 s
SVM (PUK) 59.18% 59.2% 40% 77% 59.2% 51.4% 18.49 s
MLP 80.7% 86.1% 18.9% 86.1% 80.7% 80% 0.02 s
AdaBoost 56.08% 56.1% 43% 76.7% 56.1% 45.9% 0.01 s
Compared with attack scenario 4, multiple lines are modified in attack scenario 5. Hence,
the power flow results create much more deviations from the base case normal instances compared with
scenario 4. Therefore, it is expected that the algorithms will find better results. It is also evident from the
results presented in Table 8. Where the maximum accuracy was 80.7% for scenario 4, it has increased
to 91.88% for scenario 5. In both cases, MLP is the winner among the considered algorithms in terms
of accuracy, precision, TP rate, and F-score. FP rate is also the lowest compared with other algorithms.
Table 8. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 5.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 58.39% 58.4% 41% 62.4% 58.4% 55.1% 0.06 s
BayesNet 68.16% 68.2% 31.3% 77.2% 68.2% 65.4% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 57.15% 57.1% 42.7% 57.5% 57.1% 56.8% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 71.1% 71.1% 28.4% 78.4% 71.1% 69.2% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 74.01% 74.01% 25.98% 99.97% 47.66% 64.51% 1 s
SVM (PUK) 67.75% 67.8% 31.6% 80.2% 67.8% 64.2% 15.84 s
MLP 91.88% 91.9% 8% 92.9% 91.9% 91.8% 0.02 s
AdaBoost 60.8% 60.8% 38.4% 78.1% 60.8% 53.9% 0.01 s
Similar performance behaviour is also observed for other test scenarios, e.g., scenario 6, 7 and 8
(results are presented in Tables 9–11, respectively). For all of these cases, MLP achieves the highest
accuracy and the lowest FP rate. We also introduced a combined attack case in scenario 9. The purpose
of this test scenario is to examine how the detection algorithm performs in the presence of combined
attacks where multiple attacks happened together. The proposed scheme under a combined attack
scenario (Attack Scenario 9) includes the attacks from Scenarios 2, 3 and 4. We have performed a
rigorous analysis using different algorithms presented in Table 12. The accuracy, precision, TR, FP rate,
and F-score are presented in a similar way to the above cases. Our experimental analysis shows that
attacks and normal instances are classified with high accuracy, e.g., around 99.3% using MLP. The FP
rate is also extremely low (only 0.7%). The reason is that multiple modifications in the energy database
manipulate the optimal power flow measurements, which cause more deviations as compared to a
single attack scenario. Therefore, the probability of attack detections is higher during a combined
attack scenario compared with a single attack scenario. There will be more damages if the combined
attack is not detected, but our algorithms show that it is possible to detect the attack with high accuracy,
with very few false alarms.
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Table 9. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 6.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 55.6% 55.6% 43.8% 58.7% 55.6% 51.8% 0.06 s
BayesNet 60.89% 60.9% 38.3% 77.2% 60.9% 54.3% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 56.12% 56.1% 43.8% 56.7% 56.1% 55.4% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 64.74% 64.7% 34.5% 78.2% 64.7% 60.2% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 56.60% 56.60% 43.40% 98.94% 13.77% 24.17% 0.78 s
SVM (PUK) 59.73% 59.7% 39.5% 77.1% 59.7% 52.3% 16.58 s
MLP 83.7% 83.7% 16% 87.7% 83.7% 83.3% 0.02 s
AdaBoost 56.27% 56.3% 42.8% 76.8% 56.3% 46.3% 0.01 s
Table 10. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 7.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 60.12% 60.1% 39.3% 65.7% 60.1% 56.5% 0.07 s
BayesNet 69.2% 69.2% 30.2% 79.7% 69.2% 66.4% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 74.29% 74.3% 25.2% 83.1% 74.3% 72.6% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 73.15% 73.2% 26.4% 80.4% 73.2% 71.6% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 62.08% 62.08% 37.92% 57.81% 88.86% 70.05% 0.52 s
SVM (PUK) 76.9% 76.9% 22.6% 84.1% 76.9% 75.7% 11.6 s
MLP 89.57% 89.6% 10.2% 90.9% 89.6% 89.5% 0.02 s
AdaBoost 62.33% 62.3% 36.9% 78.6% 62.3% 56.3% 0.01 s
Similar to the high voltage transmission networks, low-voltage distribution networks or
microgrids can also be vulnerable under smart grid cyber intrusions. Authors’ previous work
in [19] shows how to defend against database manipulation for low-voltage networks. The proposed
scheme in this paper can also be extended for low-voltage networks. We have applied the proposed
scheme on an IEEE 33-node low-voltage network. The data and description of the IEEE 33-node
low-voltage network can be obtained from [25]. Experiments have been performed for combined
attack scenario (scenarios 4 and 1 together) using the dataset generated from 33-bus test system. Results
are summarised in Table 13. From the results, MLP achieved the highest accuracy 94.03% with a FP
rate of only 6.1%. The next performing algorithms are SVM and DecisionTable. Therefore, for such
low-voltage test system, MLP can achieve around 94% accuracy within 0.01 s. This is acceptable for a
near-real-time detection of data integrity issues in an energy control system.
Table 11. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 8.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 93.14% 93.1% 6.8% 93.8% 93.1% 93.1% 0.07 s
BayesNet 97.48% 97.5% 2.5% 97.6% 97.5% 97.5% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 91.99% 92% 7.8% 93.1% 92% 91.9% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 97.38% 97.4% 2.6% 97.5% 97.4% 97.4% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 99.04% 99.03% 96% 100% 98.09% 99.03% 0.6 s
SVM (PUK) 97.67% 97.7% 2.3% 97.8% 97.7% 97.7% 2.8 s
MLP 99.35% 99.3% 0.6% 99.4% 99.3% 99.3% 0.02 s
AdaBoost 92.44% 92.4% 7.4% 93.4% 92.4% 92.4% 0.01 s
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Table 12. Performance evaluation for attack scenario 9.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 93.71% 93.7% 6.2% 94.1% 93.7% 93.7% 0.06 s
BayesNet 96.99% 97% 3% 97.1% 97% 97% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 92% 92% 7.8% 93.1% 92% 92% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 97.83% 97.8% 2.1% 97.9% 97.8% 97.8% 0.01 s
LSTM Deep NN 99.05% 99.03% 0.96% 100% 98.12% 99.05% 0.62 s
SVM (PUK) 98.22% 98.2% 1.7% 98.3% 98.2% 98.2% 2.71 s
MLP 99.33% 99.3% 0.7% 99.3% 99.3% 99.3% 0.02 s
AdaBoost 92% 92.1% 7.8% 93.2% 92.1% 92% 0.01 s
Table 13. Performance evaluation for 33-bus network.
Algorithms Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Time (Test)
Naïve Bayes 84.92% 84.9% 15.3% 86.1% 84.9% 84.8% 0.1 s
BayesNet 86.25% 86.2% 14.1% 88.8% 86.2% 86% 0.02 s
Logistic Regression 87.72% 87.7% 12.5% 88.3% 87.7% 87.7% 0.01 s
DecisionTable 90.75% 90.8% 9.5% 92.2% 90.8% 90.7% 0.01 s
SVM (PUK) 90.88% 90.9% 9.4% 92.3% 90.9% 90.8% 8.34 s
MLP 94.03% 94% 6.1% 94.7% 94% 94% 0.03 s
AdaBoost 85.59% 85.6% 14.8% 88.7% 85.6% 85.3% 0.01 s
The experiments presented in this paper were conducted using a computer with Intel Core i7,
16GB RAM. For all test cases, the testing run time is less than a second for the MLP algorithm, which is
sufficient for running as an IDS to ensure the data integrity of OPF module. The time required for each
testing phase is included in the output tables. Please note, the assumption is that the testing phase will
check whether the obtained measurement instances (samples) due to attack or under normal condition
require a near-real-time operation. This time requirement is typically 5 minutes (time difference
between two consecutive OPF runs in the utility operation centre). Therefore, the integrity of the
database needs to be checked within this 5-minute interval. The analysis in this work reports that
testing any data samples (including measurement data generation and testing phase) always requires
much less time than that. It is also worth noting that the training phase does not need to be updated
always as it is based on the historical data. The realistic assumption is that the training model is only
updated (or built) when the topology of the energy system network is modified. However, to improve
the performance, it is also possible to update the training model with the incremental data once a day,
but it will not affect the near real-time operation of the testing phase.
7. Conclusions
Security issues of smart grid database need more attention to ensure a reliable power system
operation. In this work, first, we consider different types of database intrusions and prepare
nine different datasets that contain both attack and normal instances. Next, we propose a
solution architecture where database intrusions are not captured directly from the database; rather,
intrusions are detected from the power flows that are obtained using the information of the
database. This classification based solution architecture utilises different state-of-the-art supervised
ML algorithms. In terms of the solution accuracy, recall, precision, and F-measures, the MLP is the best
performing algorithm for this test setup among the considered algorithms. Two IEEE benchmark test
systems have been used to generate and validate the experiments.
In this ongoing work, different attack scenarios for power system databases are explored and the
performance of different state-of-the-art supervised ML algorithms are investigated. Microgrids and
low-voltage customer-centric distribution networks are vulnerable to potential cyberattacks. In future
extension of this work, more difficult and realistic attack scenarios will be included. Impacts of
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cyberattacks on the microgrid and customer-centric low-voltage networks will be explored thoroughly
in future works.
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